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ence in these Fund approved 
payments and the claim of Ad-
vance. Id. 
The court concluded by 
giving specific judicial recog-
nition to Advance's argument, 
holding that it is consistent with 
the purposes ofthe Fund to rec-
ognize that the fiduciary ethical 
obligation embodied in Con-
duct Rule 1.15 is a fiduciary 
obligation under the Fund's stat-
utes and rules. Id. at 210-11, 
652 A.2d at 667. The court 
vacated the Fund's decision and 
Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co. v. Cochran: 
EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE MAY 







remanded for a determination 
on reimbursement. Id. at 211, 
652 A.2d at 667-68. 
In its simplest form, the 
court's decision in Advance 
Finance Co. v. Trustees ofCli-
ents 'Sec. Trust Fund of Bar of 
Md expands a non-client's eli-
gibility as a claimant against 
the Fund. However, Advance 
derives its true impact from the 
court's recognition that a non-
client's loss from an attorney's 
defalcation, at least where a cli-
ent has instructed the attorney 
In Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co. v. Cochran, 337 Md 
98, 651 A.2d 859 (1995), the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that an insured may use 
extrinsic evidence to establish a 
potentiality of coverage under 
an insurance policy when the 
plaintiff s complaint is silent as 
to possible defenses entitled to 
coverage. The court rejected an 
earlier decision by the court of 
special appeals which mandat-
ed that determining the possi-
bility of coverage of an insured 
tort defendant be made solely 
by reference to the language of 
the insurance policy and the 
complaint made against him. 
In so holding, the court reme-
died any inequities in the inter-
pretation of coverage under lia-
bility insurance policies and 
addressed public policy con-
cerns regarding an insured's 
, -_._-----
to disburse the client's funds to 
the non-client, is no less dam-
aging to the legal profession's 
credibility that the same loss to 
the client. This is precisely the 
situation the Fund was estab-
lished to address, and although 
the court's decision may in-
crease the potential for recov-
ery, it should be welcomed by 
attorneys at a time when the 
term "legal ethics" is all too 
often, whetherjustifiablyornot, 
considered a misnomer. 
-Mark L. Miller 
reasonable expectations. 
Victoria and Robert Beyer 
sued Robert Cochran for as-
sault, battery, and loss of con-
sortium for injuries Victoria re-
ceivedduringaMarch 19,1990 
altercation between Cochran 
and his brother at Cochran's 
office. At the time of the al-
leged incident, Cochran was 
covered under two office liabil-
ity policies issued by Aetna. 
Although the policies provided 
no coverage for intentional or 
expected bodily injury or prop-
erty damage caused by the acts 
of the insured, both provided 
coverage for intentional acts of 
self-defense. Despite Cochran's 
contention thatBeyer' s injuries 
occurred while he was defend-
ing himself against his broth-
er's assault, Aetna refused to 
provide him with counsel to 
defend against the Beyer ac-
tion. Aetna based its refusal on 
the policies' exclusion for in-
tentional torts not committed in 
self-defense. 
After hiring his own 
private counsel to defend 
against the Beyer suit, Cochran 
filed a declaratory judgment 
action against Aetna in the Cir-
cuit Court for Allegany County 
seeking a determination that 
Aetna had a duty to defend him 
in the Beyer action. Cochran 
contended that the allegations 
contained in the Beyer com-
plaint established the potential 
for coverage due to self-defense. 
The circuit court held that Aetna 
had no duty to defend Cochran 
in the Beyer action because the 
Beyer's complaint alleged in-
tentional torts neither covered 
nor potentially covered by the 
Aetna policies. 
The court of special ap-
peals reversed the circuit court, 
holding that Aetna had a duty to 
defend Cochran because of the 
potentiality of coverage on the 
face of the Beyer complaint. In 
an effort to clarify the ambigu-
ity surrounding an insurer's duty 
to defend an insured from tort 
claims, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland granted certiorari. 
The court began its anal-
ysis by exp laining that an insur-
er has "a duty to defend its 
insured from all claims which 
are potentially covered under 
an insurance policy." Cochran, 
337 Md. at 102, 651 A.2d at 
861, (quoting Brohawn v. 
Transamericalns. Co.,276Md. 
396,347 A.2d842 (1975)). The 
Brohawn court interpreted the 
term "potentially" to encom-
'/1' 
pass when a plaintiff s allega-
tions against an insured in a tort 
suit allege a claim covered by 
the policy in addition to any 
claim potentially covered by the 
policy. Id. at 102-03,651 A.2d 
at 861. 
The court then applied a 
two prong test to determine 
whether Aetna was under a duty 
to defend Cochran in accor-
dance with the spirit of the 
Brohawn decision. Id. at 103, 
651 A.2d at 862 (citing St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. 
Pryseski, 292 Md. 187, 438 
A.2d 282 (1981)). The first 
prong necessitated an examina-
tion of the language of the pol-
icy, construing its terms in their 
"customary, ordinary and ac-
cepted meaning," Id. at 104, 
651 A.2d at 862 (quoting 
Mitchell v. Maryland Casualty, 
324 Md. 44, 56, 595 A.2d 469, 
475 (1991)) "unless a statute, a 
regulation, or public policy is 
violated thereby." Id. at 104, 
651 A.2dat 862 (quotingPacif-
ic Indemnity Co. v. Interstate 
Fire & Casualty Co., 302 Md. 
383,488A.2d486(1985)). The 
court found that the terms of 
Cochran's policy covered all 
bodily injury resulting from 
defense of persons or property, 
even if the bodily injury was 
intended by the insured. Id. at 
104-05, 651 A.2d at 862. 
The second prong ofthe 
test required the court to deter-
mine whether the allegations of 
a tort complaint against an in-
sured could potentially bring 
the tort action within policy 
coverage. Id. at 105, 651 A.2d 
at 862. BecausetheBeyercom-
'.'j". -/, , , - , 
plaint failed to allude to the 
affirmative defense of self-de-
fense, the paramount issue be-
came whether Cochran could 
use extrinsic evidence of self-
defense to show that his actions 
could potentially be covered by 
the policies. Relying on a past 
decision of the court of special 
appeals, Aetna argued for adop-
tion of the exclusive pleading 
rule which would mandate that 
a determination of a potentiali-
ty of coverage be made solely 
by reference to the insurance 
policy and the complaint and 
not by use of extrinsic evidence. 
Id. at 105, 651 A.2d at 863 
(citing Eastern Shore Finan-
cial v. Donegal Mut., 84 Md. 
App.609,581 A.2d452(1990), 
cert.denied sub nom. Insley v, 
Old Guard Mut. Ins. Co., 322 
Md. 131, 586A.2d 13 (1991)). 
The court of appeals 
rejected the application of the 
exclusive pleading rule to in-
surance contracts and deter-
mined that insurance policies 
and allegations in complaints 
"are not the sole means of es-
tablishing a potentiality of cov-
erage." Id. at 108,651 A.2dat 
864. The court added that an 
application of the exclusive 
pleading rule to insurance con-
tracts would unfairly leave the 
insured atthe mercy ofthe plain-
tiff s complaint and would vir-
tually preclude him from prov-
ing a potentiality of coverage in 
assault and battery cases, where 
coverage could only be estab-
lished by tendering a defense to 
the claims. Id. at 108-09,651 
A.2d at 864. The court further 
supported its rejection of the 
exclusive pleading rule by cit-
ing a decision which held that 
an insured receives the benefit 
of the doubt when potential cov-
erage is uncertain from the alle-
gations in the complaint. Id. at 
107,651 A.2d at 863-64 (citing 
US.F & G. v. Nat. Pav. Co., 
228 Md. 40, 178 A.2d 872 
(1962)). The exclusive plead-
ing rule, the court opined, can 
often deprive the insured of the 
benefit of his bargain in an in-
surance contract by permitting 
the insurer to look exclusively 
at the complaint and ignore val-
id defenses to avoid coverage. 
Id. at 110-11,651 A.2d at 865. 
The court noted an ex-
ception for frivolous defenses 
Curry v. Hillcrest 
Clinic, Inc.: 














made by the insured solely to 
establish an insurer's duty to 
defend. Id. at 111-12,651 A.2d 
at 866. In combatting potential 
abuse, the court limited an in-
sured's use of extrinsic evidence 
to establish a potentiality of 
coverage to situations where 
the insured can demonstrate a 
"reasonable potential that the 
issue triggering coverage will 
be generated at trial." Id. at 
112, 651 A.2d at 866. Because 
Cochran had presented corrob-
orating testimony and other 
evidence supporting the poten-
tiality of coverage, the court 
found that Cochran's claim of 
self-defense was not frivolous. 
Id. at 112, 651 A.2d at 866. 
In Curry v. Hillcrest 
Clinic, Inc., 337 Md. 412, 653 
A.2d 934 (1995), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that 
where a common basis of lia-
bility is alleged against co-de-
fendants, one of whom has been 
found in default, a finding in 
favor ofthe non-defaulting co-
defendant automatically inures 
to the benefit of the defaulting 
co-defendant. In such cases, 
despite an original order of de-
fault, damages cannot be as-
sessed against the defaulting 
co-defendant. Consequently, 
the order in default must be 
stricken. This holding signi-
fied the court of appeal's rec-
ognition, affirmance, and con-
tinued acceptance of the Frow 
, 
-~------ --------
Aetna Casualty & Sure-
ty Company v. Cochran clearly 
reinforces the public policy con-
cern that insurance policy hold-
ers should not be unreasonably 
precluded from receiving the 
coverage bargained for in their 
insurance contracts. The court's 
holding will make it consider-
ably more difficult for insurers 
to avoid their obligations to de-
fend insureds, while simulta-
neously providing a safeguard 
against frivolous claims of po-
tential coverage. 
- Jeffrey A. Friedman 
doctrine, first enunciated in the 
United States Supreme Court 
decision Frow v. De La Vega, 
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 552 (1872). 
Curry involved a mal-
practice claim filed with the 
Health Claims Arbitration Of-
fice (HCAO) alleging the neg-
ligence and liability of Dr. 
Sharma and the liability of 
Hillcrest Clinic (Hillcrest), 
Sharma's employer, under the 
doctrine of respondeat superi-
or. Hillcrest failed to answer 
Curry's complaint, and an or-
der of default was entered by 
the HCAO Director against 
Hillcrest stating that the amount 
of damages owed by Hillcrest 
was to be determined by the 
HCAO arbitration panel. 
